This paper looks at the ways in which culturalist discourses have influenced our understanding and representation of the rise of the so-called Islamic State. It argues that, in keeping with older narratives on the motives of "bad" Muslims, its political and economic objectives have been overlooked and/or downplayed. Instead, I propose, there has been a strategically efficacious focus on its appeal to Islam, on its sectarian rhetoric and on its use of violence. By continuing to emphasise the ethical over the political in these ways, the culturalism that underpins the dominant representation of the Islamic State's emergence has, I conclude, served three key purposes -the mobilisation of the "good" Muslim, the exculpation of Western foreign policy and the legitimisation of force.
Stengel, this has substantiated an extensive programme of 'ideological delegitimization' -defined as 'burying its false appeals to religious legitimacy and glory through rapid response messaging to expose its true nature as a barbaric and criminal enterprise devoted to mass murder of innocents'. 5 The result has been the emergence of a dominant (although not uncontested) discourse that has, I argue below, three principal elements -each of which provides a framework both for presenting ad-Dawlah's motives and for legitimising the contingent response from the West.
The first is that the insurgency is principally mobilised by faith. It is, more specifically, driven not by political or economic objectives, but by a particular interpretation of Islam. This, it is suggested below, helpfully offers policy-makers an interpretation of the threat faced that is simultaneously global, yet also limited to what Mahmood Mamdani calls "bad" Muslims who must be defeated in the type of modernising act of liberation that underpinned the invasion of
Iraq. The second is that ad-Dawlah's success is best understood as a result of ancient sectarian hatreds bubbling over once the guiding hand of Western occupation ended in 2011. In a similar discourse to that which persuaded President Clinton little could done to save Bosnian Muslims once Yugoslavia crumbled in the early 1990s, this precept has the convenient corollary of absolving Western states from any responsibility for the pattern of violence that has emerged in Iraq since its troops came home. The third is that ad-Dawlah has deployed an exceptional (in some discourses unique) level of brutality. This is not purposive, or -in Mamdani's terms -"modern" violence, but senseless, cultish and nihilistic. It therefore cannot be reasoned with and can only be confronted with force, the preferred policy of the West to date. Connecting each of these three discourses is a fundamental commonality -the primacy of culture -and it is thus here that the paper will begin.
Good Muslim, Bad Muslim
The starting point is to identify the nature of the battle. It is against Islamist extremism. ...We have to unite with those in the Muslim world, who agree with this analysis to fight the extremism.
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As Mahmood Mamdani has observed, the post-Cold War period has been 'marked by the ascendancy and rapid politicizing of a single term: culture'. 7 This has, Etienne Balibar argues, reintroduced the older idea that 'the historical cultures of humanity can be divided into two main groups, the one assumed to be universalistic and progressive, the other supposed irremediably particularistic and primitive'. 8 Accentuated by the apparently growing "religious" flavour of Muslim militancy at home and abroad, attention has moved away from political explanations of motive towards an emphasis upon faith and ideology within which, Mamdani observes, there exists a clear distinction between moral commentaries on bloodshed in defence of modernity and the apparent "senselessness" of violence that cannot be justified by progress. Instances of the latter, he continues, predominantly remain within "premodern" societies (such as the "communal" conflicts of Asia or "ethnic" wars of sub-Saharan Africa) and are principally presented in cultural terms. When these confront the apparently unimpeachable values of the West, such challenges are seen as self-evidently anti-modern and theologically evil. Largely ignoring materialist and power motives, the key premise here is, for Mamdani, the assumption 'that every culture has a tangible essence that defines it'. Politics and economics are, he continues, thus presented as merely 'a consequence of that essence'. It is, he concludes, 'no longer the market (capitalism), nor the state (democracy), but culture (modernity) that is said to be the dividing line between those in favor of a peaceful, civic existence and those inclined to
Nowhere is this dualism more apparent than in the West's representation of the Middle East.
Here, culturalist narratives rest upon four principal dogmas, first identified by Edward Said.
These are 1) that the West is normatively better (measured in ways that suit contemporary foreign policy imperatives) 2) that conclusions drawn from ancient traditions, "classic" texts or "sacred" ideas are more insightful than the direct experience of modernity 3) 'that the Orient is eternal, uniform, and incapable of defining itself' and must therefore be understood through the scientifically objective lens of the Western perspective 4) that the East is intrinsically antithetical, dangerous and needs to be controlled ('by pacification, research and development, outright occupation whenever possible') or feared. 10 In elevating Western values without resorting to the overtly ethnicised narratives of yesteryear, these helped to structure the West's view of the Middle East by extending 'discourses structured around categories of hierarchy and superiority to one in which cultural difference is argued to be the key operational factor'. 11 In its crudest from, then, culturalism establishes a simplistic dualism in which a dynamic and vibrant
West is contrasted with a moribund and static East. As Mamdani observes, 'except for a founding prophetic moment and some monuments, Muslims are simply born into a culture, and are said to live it like a destiny'. 12 Muslims do not make culture, culture makes Muslims.
Many policy intellectuals have, however, maintained that such broad-brush assumptions are unlikely to prove productive in a Global War on Terror in which Muslim allies will be essential.
The result has been a more refined form of culturalism that has sought to distinguish between Eschewing clerical input, then, the writers of Dabiq generally prefer to approach exegetic sources directly in order to present an action-orientated discourse in which the ends -the establishment of a Sunni homeland -justify the means. As Adnani put it when subpoenaed to a shari'a court: 'the only law I subscribe to is the law of the jungle'. 30 Ad-Dawlah is, in other words, not principally mobilised by any particular branch/distortion of Islam. Neither Wahhabi nor salafi, it is driven forward by the quintessentially political objective of state-building. It is not the very broad debating positions that it shares with other "bad" Muslims that explain its social power, but the fact that it has converted these into a potent set of policies which distribute political goods to its constituents. Focussing on its interpretation of complex jurisprudential matters as part of a misplaced attempt to portray ad-Dawlah as an example of a particular cultural orientation misses the vital (or perhaps, defining) issue of political expediency.
Reinforcing an exclusive category for the Sunni believer in contra-distinction to the "rafidi" (the dominant theme of Dabiq's third edition). Politically, it similarly serves domestic and international purposes. Since the Khalifah has rationally ruled through semi-autonomous local elites, the declaration (which was accompanied by an important statement promising to return its subjects' 'dignity, might, rights, and leadership') was also intended to reassure already affiliated Sunni tribes that their interests will continue to be represented. 33 More broadly, it marks a powerful rejection both the Anglo-French borders that divide the region and Iran's projection of its international doctrine, the Wilayat al-Faqih (or Guardianship of the Jurists), through which it claims to have authority over Iraq and Syria's Shi'a.
Moreover, the symbolic significance of the move is, far from representing the apogee of salafism's virulent Islamism, also to be found in its geo-political resonance. Traditionally, the leadership of the Khilafah has never been, as the Abbasi scholar, al-Mawardi, makes clear, the most pious or the most knowledgeable, but simply those best able to protect the well-being of the people. 34 The result has been a separation of powers between administrative authority and a largely independent class of theologians headed, for most of the last six centuries, by a 
Sectarianism, Occupation and Ancient Hatreds
It was not because they are Shia, but because... the American army was facilitating the takeover of Iraq and giving the country to them. 38 Culturalism holds that the violence of "bad" Muslims in general, and that of ad-Dawlah in particular, can be found in the ancient hatreds that are said to have always existed between Shi'a and Sunni. In a discourse strikingly similar to commentaries on the role of Tito in Yugoslavia, it is said that the Hussein and Assad families kept a lid on these tensions through Ba'athism's repressive patrimonialism. As soon as people had the opportunity -via a combination of rebellion and external intervention -to express their identities more freely, then, the narrative goes, a return to confessional chauvinism becomes all but inevitable. As Tony Blair puts it, 'once the regime changes, then out come pouring all the tensions -tribal, ethnic and of course above all religious; ...the sectarian divisions become even more acute and the result is the mess we see all over the region'.
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In the immediate aftermath of the 2003 invasion, there was a general sense that there would be some settling of old scores in Iraq (freedom is untidy, Donald Rumsfeld explained). As the scale of the resistance became clear, however, the Coalition increasingly represented its forces as caught between two primordial and incommensurate blocs -thereby distancing the impact of its policies from the source of the violence. Az-Zarqawi's 'fear and loathing of Iraq's Shi'ite majority' and his attempts at 'goading them into a sectarian civil war' were said to be the primary impetus behind the violence of a 'clandestine Salafist presence'. 40 The origins of adDawlah's ideology is, the former spy Alastair Crooke concludes, 'deeply rooted in bigotry: a hatred of the "other", and for the Shi'i [sic] and Iran in particular'. 41 The distinguished historian, Michael Burleigh, concurs thus: 'at the heart of the terrifying meltdown in Iraq is the centuriesold hatred between two Muslim ideologies: Sunni and Shia'. 42 Such narratives are both a corollary to the culturalist discourse on faith discussed above and an extension of its depoliticising functions. They usefully move attention away from any possible extra-regional influences over Iraq and Syria's disintegration and towards a sense of hopeless inevitability, to which the West can only respond with a combination of resignation and securitisation. As defence analysts at the House of Commons explain, the origins of the current conflagration 'must be traced back' to the intrinsic cultural incommensurability of the region's component partswhich render Iraq 'fundamentally fractious (and perhaps fundamentally not viable)'. 43 We must therefore, Tony Blair concludes, 'liberate ourselves from the notion that "we" have caused this'.
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In actual fact, the UK has, perhaps, primary responsibility for the politicisation of sectarian consciousness in Iraq. Its mandate, 1920 to 1932, was established via the largely Sunni officer corps of the former Ottoman army which, along with directly controlled Christian Assyrian militia, was used to suppress an uprising co-led by Nuri al-Maliki's grandfather. British authority was then solidified by importing and empowering a Sunni monarchy ejected from Syria by a
French regime keen to offer the Druze and Alawite Shi'a 'administrative autonomy in an attempt to induce a strain of separatism' that would render its mandate easier to manage. 45 Iraqi Sunnis were similarly given the governance of all but one of the country's then 14 provinces, filling 52 of 57 cabinet appointments made before 1936. 46 Post-independence politics were, as a consequence, marked by considerable instability, with seven political coups and a large-scale massacre of Assyrians occurring within the first decade.
The imposition of Ba'athism as the dominant political form in Iraq was, in many ways, an attempt to manage these conflicts. Its multi-denominational origins and fierce secularism appealed across the confessional divides that had so strengthened during the colonial period. 
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This presented an acute problem for the Coalition's attempts to find Iraqis with which to govern.
Since the preference was -as per RAND's recommendations -for staunchly secular, or at least "liberally" religious, "good" Muslims, it turned to the "moderate" Shi'a, Ahmad Chalabi.
Described by Al Gore as a 'spokesperson for millions', he had considerable influence in the make-up of the Iraqi Governing Council appointed by the Coalition in July 2003. 50 With 13 Shi'a Arabs, five Sunni Arabs, five Kurds, one Turkmen and one Assyrian, this marked a considerable departure from the confessional structure of the previous regime, despite little demographic evidence to support such a division. According to Thomas Ricks, Chalabi was also instrumental in persuading Coalition Administrator, Paul Bremer, not only to dismiss around 85,000 Ba'ath party members (including the removal of all pension rights for ranks of colonel equivalent and above), but also to disband both the 385,000-strong Iraqi army and the entire staff of the Interior Ministry (285,000 individuals including the police force). 51 Forced through against the advice of the military, this created a 'vast pool of humiliated, antagonized, and poiticized men'. 52 The result was an explosion of violence stretching from Sunni Fallujah to Shi'a Najaf. 
Wanton Barbarity and the Proto-State
Rapid social changes in history have always been facilitated by violence.
Violence is never aimless: it is always directed to a specific end; it always serves the interests of a particular group, or individual, and undermines that of another. 66 Given its sophisticated use of news media and its penchant for gruesomely murdering Westerners, it is perhaps unsurprising that ad-Dawlah's violence has received so much attention.
Influenced by the informational apparatus of Operation Inherent Resolve, culturalist perspectives have predominated, leading to the emergence of three inter-related discourses. Berger as 'a compilation of lessons learned', it advocates drawing Western Powers into a direct confrontation with insurgents followed by attritive guerrilla activities intended to amass casualties and diminish their domestic support -a strategy common to rebels facing a much stronger external force (particularly a democracy). 79 Ad-Dawlah's use of violence is therefore 'not some whimsical, crazed fanaticism, but a very deliberate, considered strategy'. 80 Its execution videos are theatrical and carefully judged using highly staged symbols of American power (orange jumpsuits, Guantanamo-style cages and so on) to project the most political of challenges. In line with al-Naji's recommendations, these combine direct addresses to Western leaders in which the actions to follow are presented as recompense for the arrival of the "crusaders" on Muslim (ie. Sunni) lands with graphic violence intended to provoke moral outrage. This is based on his highly instrumental reasoning that, in the pursuit of an expected greater good, it is acceptable to disregard the restraints of mainstream Islamic jurisprudence and equate jihad with 'naught but violence, crudeness, terrorism, frightening (others), and massacring'. to 15,000 strong PMU contribution to the Syrian Army. 89 As a result, the United States is, in the words of its longest serving official in Iraq, Ali Khedery, 'now acting as the air force, the armory, and the diplomatic cover for Iraqi militias that are. continues, 'the righteousness of self goes alongside the demonization of the other as evil', "our"
violence is, as per culturalist dogma, presented as 'necessary to historical progress' and is thus normatively better (measured in ways that suit contemporary foreign policy imperatives). 94 A moral taxonomy of good versus evil therefore tends to be particularly powerfully invoked when the "communal", "sectarian" or "ethnic" conflicts of "bad" Muslims spill over and threaten the progressive intervention of the West -after all, 'the Islamic State became impossible to ignore not when it conducted mass executions, on camera, of hundreds of Iraqi and Syrian fighters, but when it beheaded western hostages'. 95 This serves to remove the enemy from the political realm, to legitimise the "progressive" violence of the West and to disable alternative responses. In reality, the terms "moderate" and "extremist" are 'not adjectives describing the attitude of Muslims to Islam. They [a]re actually adjectives describing the attitudes of Muslims to the West'; not, in other words, a shared understanding of the faith, but a political response to the West's post-911 insistence that all "good" Muslims are 'now under obligation to prove their credentials by joining a war against "bad Muslims"'.
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Conclusion
Using a culturalist approach to move the distinction between "good" and "bad" Muslims away from the political criteria of support for Western policy and towards an ethical distinction has three great advantages. The first, noted by Mamdani, is that it deflects accusations of facile generalisation by offering a more nuanced focus on conflict within civilisations. As Arthur Schlesinger put it after the 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, 'retaining the support of moderate Muslim states' relies on meeting the challenge of 'disproving Huntington'. 97 Instead, the enemy must be clearly defined as 'a more specific variant or even a perversion of Islam'. 98 By particularising the war on terror in this way, it has been recast as an emancipatory endeavour 'intended to liberate "good" Muslims from the political yoke of "bad" ones'. 99 The invasion of Iraq was thus 'supposed to be a realisation of this inspiration. It was said that once the bad Muslim was overthrown, the good ones would rise to the occasion'. 100 As Mamdani observes, though, since 'the war on terror demands nothing less than capitulation as the seal of recognition of a "good" or "moderate" Muslim', those defined as "bad" Muslims concluded that they may be 'next on the American agenda [and we]re smart enough to know that they better make a stand in
Iraq rather than wait their turn'. 101 As this became more and more apparent, Muslim political violence in general, and ad-Dawlah in particular, were increasingly identified with the principle ideological foe of the post-Cold War era -a global Wahhabi/salafi conspiracy against the West and its "moderate" Muslim friends. In keeping with culturalists' tendency to disregard what the "Orient" says about itself, this expediently obfuscates the political character of Muslim mobilisation behind a paper-thin discourse on "Islamic extremism".
Culturalism's second advantage has been that, when Iraq did not go according to plan, it offered an explanation of Muslim "badness" that did not implicate the occupation. Since the invasion was a modern and progressive force for change, violent resistance must be motivated by endemic backwardness. Overlooking both the divisive legacy of colonialism and the Coalition's policy of arming the two largest factions of Iraqi society, this discourse 'conveniently explained politics as not the result of a relationship between two or more, but as the inevitable outcome of the culture of one party'. 102 The bloodshed which followed the "liberation" of Iraq was thus not a political response (or even an attempt to retake the oilfields), but a result of an internecine and incomprehensible ancient hatred between Shi'a and Sunni given free reign by Rumsfeld's postwar "nation-building lite", Such a process, Mamdani points out, is intrinsic to the culturalist logic of the war on terror: 'the implication is unmistakable and undisguised: whether in Afghanistan, Palestine, or Pakistan, Islam must be quarantined and the devil exorcized from it by a Muslim civil war'. 103 This is, many believe, the only way to deal with 'the Islamic State's medieval religious nature'. 104 As Douglas Murray concludes, 'the region as a whole may be starting to go through something similar to what Europe went through in the early 17th century during the Thirty Years' War, when Protestant and Catholic states battled it out. This is a conflict which... will re-align not only the Middle East, but the religion of Islam'. 105 Culturalism thus facilitated a third advantage; that because the violence of the "bad" Muslim is not driven by a rational engagement with the policies and presence of the West, it cannot be reasoned with and should, instead, be met with force. After all, if conflicts 'are understood as no more than settled history or human nature rearing its ugly head, then there is nothing that can be done in the present to resolve the tension except repress or ignore such struggles'. 106 Since, in broad terms, 'bad Muslims are doctrinal, antimodern, and virulent, …[and] productive of fear and preemptive police or military action', culturalist explanatory commentaries stress exegetic and ideological concerns over possible political and economic motives. 107 The result has been a generalised and prospectively efficacious sense that social engagement is likely to be of limited value. As Richard Jackson observes, by 'denying the rational political demands of insurgent groups... the "Islamic terrorism" discourse normalizes and legitimizes a restricted set of coercive and punitive counter-terrorism strategies, whilst simultaneously making non-violent alternatives such as dialogue, compromise and reform appear inconceivable and nonsensical'. 108 Such robust remedial action seems more reasonable if the culprit is considered to be criminal, dangerously deviant or evil-minded. 'Jihadist leaders', are therefore characterised by commentators such as Frederick Kagan, 'evil and, by our standards, insane'. 109 By viewing ad-Dawlah as 'a cancer' apparently responsible for 'a level of atrocity towards mankind that, post-Nazism, we hoped we would never again witness', Western leaders place its violence within a 'moral category, defined as absolute evil and divorced from any social, strategic or quite simply political context', thereby precluding critical debate and justifying their own strategic policy preferences. 
